PSYCHOLOGY AND LAWYERING:
COALESCING THE FIELD
Jean R. Sternlight*
There is some tendency, with the case method, for the study of law to be something like the study of chess or the analysis of a bridge hand. When analyzing
the law in intricate detail, it may be hard to keep in mind the vital fact that the
problems really relate to people . . . .1
Although, historically, some may have thought of lawyers as walking talking brains,2 more recently we have seen increasing recognition that law is a
people profession. After all, lawyers spend a substantial portion of their time
interviewing and counseling clients; negotiating and mediating; conducting discovery, factual research, and due diligence; and advocating orally and in writing. While these tasks do require good legal analytical skills they also require
other traits relating to lawyers’ ability to work with people.3 And, it is important to recognize that lawyers’ own mental states can impact how well or
poorly they do their jobs.4
Within the last ten years some legal academics and also practitioners in a
variety of legal fields began to appreciate that psychology—the science of how
people think, feel, and behave,5 can be very helpful to attorneys’ practice of
law.6 Expanding far beyond the long-time recognition that psychology can help
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attorneys pick juries or be persuasive in the courtroom,7 such commentators
began to discuss how psychology might inform legal writing,8 legal ethics,9
conceptions of justice,10 and attorney wellness and success.11 My co-author
Jennifer Robbennolt and I brought together some aspects of this field in our
book Psychology for Lawyers: Understanding the Human Factors in Negotiation, Litigation, and Decision Making.12
Yet, while a number of commentators were applying psychology to lawyering, they were not necessarily drawing from the same aspects of psychology
as one another, nor connecting to each other through their writing or in person.
Some commentators focused particularly on cognitive and social psychology,13
some on insights drawn from clinical psychology,14 some on the benefits of
mindfulness meditation,15 some on attorneys’ struggles with alcohol and substance abuse,16 and some on neuroscience.17 Even my lengthy book, with Jennifer Robbennolt, addressed only certain aspects of psychology and lawyering,
focusing quite little for example on insights drawn from clinical psychology,
abnormal psychology, or neuroscience.18
EVIDENCE LAW (2016); DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROCESS (2012).
7
This was the traditional realm of psychology and lawyering. See, e.g., DENNIS J. DEVINE,
JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE (2012); RICHARD C. WAITES,
COURTROOM PSYCHOLOGY AND TRIAL ADVOCACY (2002).
8
See, e.g., Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006
MICH. ST. L. REV. 411.
9
See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining,
91 MARQ. L. REV. 183 (2007).
10
See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE (1988); Kevin M. Carlsmith & John M. Darley, Psychological Aspects of Retributive
Justice, 40 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 193 (2008)
11
See, e.g., NANCY LEVIT & DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE HAPPY LAWYER: MAKING A GOOD
LIFE IN THE LAW (2010).
12
JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS:
UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING
(2013) (drawing on psychology to help lawyers with interviewing, counseling, negotiation,
mediation, discovery, writing, ethics, productivity and success); see also Jean R. Sternlight
& Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Psychology and Effective Lawyering: Insights for Legal Educators, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365 (2015).
13
ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 12.
14
See, e.g., SUSAN SWAIM DAICOFF, LAWYER, KNOW THYSELF: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
OF PERSONALITY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES (2004)
15
See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions
of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers, and their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1 (2002).
16
See, e.g., G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse,
and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 233 (1990).
17
See, e.g., DAVID BALL AND DON KEENAN, REPTILE: THE 2009 MANUAL OF THE PLAINTIFF’S
REVOLUTION (2009); Debra S. Austin, Killing Them Softly: Neuroscience Reveals How
Brain Cells Die from Law School Stress and How Neural Self-Hacking Can Optimize Cognitive Performance, 59 LOY. L. REV. 791 (2013).
18
ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 12.

Spring 2015]

PSYCHOLOGY AND LAWYERING

433

A number of us thought it would be highly informative as well as fun to try
to bring together as many of us as possible who had been separately toiling in
the fields of psychology and lawyering. Thus, UNLV’s Boyd School of Law
and its Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution decided to host a conference entitled Psychology and Lawyering: Coalescing the Field. Two other schools
with strong programs in the area, the University of Illinois and U.C. Davis
School of Law, generously made financial contributions in support of the conference.19 When we came up with the idea for the conference we were not sure
how many scholars would be willing and able to attend, particularly at their
own expense. We were shocked and thrilled by the outpouring of interest by
professors and practitioners, from a variety of fields, from around the world.
The conference, which took place in February 2014, was indeed a fun and
highly productive event. We learned a great deal from one another and vowed
to gather again to further our connections. The conference helped spark a blog
on behavioral legal ethics,20 and much talk about potential future conferences.
Today we are very pleased to present the written version of the conference,
which we hope will further advance and connect this field.21 Like the conference, this symposium covers a broad array of topics. We have tried to group all
the articles into five broad thematic groups: interviewing and counseling; legal
advocacy; behavioral legal ethics; attorney and student personal wellbeing; and
fairness and justice.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INSIGHTS FOR INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING
The conference began most auspiciously with Randy Kiser’s discussion of
The Emotionally Attentive Lawyer: Balancing the Rule of Law with the Realities of Human Behavior.22 A brilliant scholar and legal consultant, Kiser has
written several books presenting original research on lawyers’ judgment and
decision making skills, or lack thereof.23 In this article he emphasizes that
“[t]he law and emotions have an uneasy if not antagonistic relationship,” explaining that while law is in some sense supposed to rise above emotion, the
successful practice of law nonetheless “requires a high level of emotional intelligence.”24 Drawing on a set of attorney interviews Kiser finds that lawyers of19
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ten realize the importance of people skills.25 Yet, he also reports that law
schools are far behind medical schools in trying to teach such skills to their students.26
Building on Kiser’s themes, William S. Blatt’s Teaching Emotional Intelligence to Law Students: Three Keys to Mastery27 urges that the standard law
school curriculum “develops the logical and linguistic abilities needed for passing the bar and performing an entry-level job, but neglects the managerial and
relationship skills essential to advancing in the profession.”28 Yet, urges Blatt,
such skills as stress reduction, self-awareness, emotional management, and performance optimization can indeed be taught, as he has done for six years in a
course entitled “Emotional Intelligence: Life Skills for Lawyers.”29
Susan Brooks addresses related questions when she faces head-on the question of whether we can “actually teach empathy and other relational skills” and
if so, “what does it look like to teach them in law school?”30 Her article, Using
a Communication Perspective to Teach Relational Lawyering,31 spells out how
law professors can draw on five key principles of communication32 and then
translates these principles into eight practices law professors can share with
their students.33 Brooks emphasizes that students should be taught a noninstrumental approach to lawyering—where lawyers strive for meaningful and
“generative” dialogue with their clients,34 rather than merely attempt to solve
the client’s problems or persuade the client to follow the lawyer’s advice.35
Next, Debra Lyn Bassett turns to the content of attorney interactions with
their clients. In Silencing Our Elders, she urges that while words are critically
important to interviewing, counseling, and other lawyering activities, it is also
essential to understand the role of silence in communication.36 Drawing extensively on communication literature Bassett points out that it is crucial for lawyers to understand that, rather than just being an absence of sound, and therefore communication, silence often has meaning and power.37 In Parts I and II of
her article Bassett also connects what she calls “silence bias” to age bias, noting
that lawyers’ instincts to avoid silence and fill in speech voids, when combined
25
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with age bias, “can lead to consequences ranging from inaccurate assumptions
to unwarranted conclusions of diminished capacity.”38
Also focusing on the content of interviews, Andrea A. Curcio examines
how biases and stereotypes may impact lawyers’ interviews of their clients, as
well as other activities.39 She draws on two surveys of law students suggesting
that law students believe “legal ‘objectivity’ and legal training in rational and
analytical thinking makes lawyers less susceptible than others, and especially
less susceptible than clients, to having, or acting upon, stereotypes or biases.”40
However, argues Curcio, when interacting with clients, lawyers and law students are by no means immune to stereotypes and biases.41 She urges that legal
educators use social cognition theory as “the cornerstone of a program of legal
education that recognizes the need to infuse the curriculum with an awareness
of the role culture plays in the lawyering process.”42
The last piece dealing with interviewing and counseling is Sarah F. Shelton’s article, Evaluating the Evaluation: Reliance upon Mental Health Assessments in Cases of Alleged Child Sexual Abuse.43 Focusing on the very special
and difficult situation in which children make allegations of sexual abuse, Shelton points out how knowledge of the psychology of memory, communication,
childhood development, and emotion can help both forensic psychologists and
attorneys better ensure the accuracy of children’s testimony and also provide a
less stressful environment for child witnesses.44
PSYCHOLOGICAL INSIGHTS RELATING TO LEGAL ADVOCACY
Shifting gears just a bit, the next set of articles focuses on how psychology
is relevant to trial practice and written advocacy. Larry Cunningham’s article,
Using Principles from Cognitive Behavioral Therapy to Reduce Nervousness in
Oral Argument or Moot Court,45 shows how both individual attorneys and legal
educators can employ therapeutic tools to help attorneys better overcome fear,
anxiety, and even panic relating to courtroom performances. Cunningham
states that while legal educators should not provide “unlicensed therapy,” it is
nonetheless appropriate to “provide students with suggestions for reducing their
nervousness,” just as we “teach students how to respond to judges’ ques38
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tions.”46 Such tools may both increase lawyers’ effectiveness and also make
lawyers happier.47
Moving to the content of what lawyers say in the courtroom, Kenneth D.
Chestek’s Of Reptiles and Velcro: The Brain’s Negativity Bias and Persuasion,48 explains why focusing on fear and other negatives can work well in the
courtroom, just as it apparently does in political ads. Chestek quotes one neuropsychologist, Rick Hanson, who states “[y]our brain is like Velcro for negative
experiences and Teflon for positive ones.”49 While recognizing the need for additional empirical research in the area,50 Chestek at least tentatively suggests
that even educated judges, who may seek to battle the negativity effect, are
likely nonetheless impacted by the phenomenon.51 Thus, perhaps law professors and lawyers do lawyers a disservice when they counsel them to always
stay positive and take the high ground in their arguments?52
Of course, our focus on negativity is not the only aspect of psychology that
may help attorneys enhance their persuasive talents. Sydney A. Beckman urges
that attorneys can use some of magicians’ psychological tools to “manipulate”
witnesses at trial.53 He explains that “[m]isdirection, misinformation, selective
attention, ambiguity, verbal manipulation, body language interpretation, and
physical manipulation”54 are skills useful to “some of the greatest trial lawyers
in their constant quest to win.”55 Yet jurors and judges, unlike the magician’s
audience, may not realize they have been fooled.56 Rather than endorse these
techniques, Beckman also provides some possible countermeasures that can be
employed to try to battle such deception.57
BEHAVIORAL LEGAL ETHICS
Three of the articles contained in this symposium issue relate to the topic
of behavioral legal ethics, which draws on psychology for insights into peoples’
46
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ethical behavior. First, Catherine Gage O’Grady’s article focuses on the question of how behavioral legal ethics and the psychology of judgment, problem
solving, and decision making applies to newer as opposed to more senior attorneys.58 She asserts that while all attorneys are affected by psychological pressures that may cause them to act unethically,59 newer attorneys are particularly
vulnerable to certain pressures, for example due to their lack of job security and
lack of familiarity with legal practice.60 Yet, such newer attorneys are also especially well positioned to notice ethical implications that may be missed by
their senior colleagues.61 Given this psychology, O’Grady suggests law firms
and law schools take steps not only to protect newer attorneys but also to encourage newer attorneys to report perceived ethical problems to their supervisors.62
Randy D. Gordon and Nancy B. Rapoport, drawing on their combined
backgrounds in law teaching, legal practice, the humanities, and social science,63 explore how the classical concept of “virtue” may relate to legal billing,
and whether it is “possible for lawyers to develop some billing habits that will
make it easier for them to bill more ethically.”64 First considering how a “virtuous” lawyer would bill his or her time,65 the authors then go on to consider how
law firms might use incentives, improved monitoring, and alternative billing
practices66 to instill more ethical billing habits in their attorneys. Their goal is
not necessarily to make all lawyers ethical billers, but rather to use a set of
pragmatic reforms to encourage them to act as ethical billers.67
In the contribution entitled Mindful Ethics and the Cultivation of Concentration Scott L. Rogers and Jan L. Jacobowitz argue that mindfulness meditation, a secular practice increasingly used by lawyers and others to reduce stress,
improve concentration, and fight anxiety and depression,68 can also help attorneys behave more ethically.69 They further argue that “mindfulness and ethics
58
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enjoy a symbiotic connection, such that an attorney’s deliberate attentiveness to
the rules of professional conduct as a personal ethic can help cultivate a mindfulness practice.”70 Mindfulness and ethics are well paired, argue the authors,
because mindfulness, “a practice of developing greater awareness of our interpersonal interactions and of the events taking place in our lives, along with our
reactions to those events . . . lends itself to a conversation on ethical and professional conduct.”71
PSYCHOLOGICAL WELLBEING OF ATTORNEYS AND LAW STUDENTS
Another exciting group of essays discusses how attorneys and law students
can draw on psychology to enhance their personal success and wellbeing.
Marybeth Herald’s contribution, Getting Students Psyched: Using Psychology
to Encourage Classroom Participation,72 is a must-read for professors, and
perhaps especially law professors who teach first-year courses. Herald suggests
multiple approaches professors can use to help students overcome their fears
and anxieties over class participation, linking these approaches to psychological
research. In particular, she examines how students are affected by their own
body language,73 the importance of recognizing that mistakes will be made but
can be learned from,74 the fact that our mistakes are not as obvious as we may
feel,75 the value of reframing nervousness as excitement,76 and the need to be
wary of the bystander effect which might lead some students to sit back and let
others carry the conversation.77
Next, Lauren A. Newell examines insights psychology provides regarding
how our ever-present digital devices are impacting the attention of both law
students and lawyers.78 Newell cites numerous studies showing there is reason
to be concerned that information and communication technologies (the term
used to describe smartphones, tablets, e-mail, the internet, and all our many
technological vices) are “significantly eroding our ability to pay focused attention, even when we want and try to do so.”79 She points out that this impact is
likely a special concern for today’s young people, as they are more immersed in
digital technology than older folks, and for lawyers, as their job requires strong
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powers of attention.80 Thankfully, Newell not only presents this rather bleak
analysis but also some potential solutions such as the desirability and feasibility
of shutting off the technology, taking technology breaks, and learning to practice mindfulness or concentration meditation as a means of enhancing attention
powers.81
Debra S. Austin’s article, Drink Like a Lawyer: The Neuroscience of Substance Abuse and Its Impact on Cognitive Wellness,82 also contains information
that is critically important for law students, lawyers, and law professors. While
Austin is certainly not the first to note that lawyers suffer inordinately from
anxiety, stress, depression, and substance abuse,83 her article uniquely delves
into the neuroscience underlying these phenomena.84 Rather than simply make
us more depressed, by learning about lawyers’ and law students’ unfortunate
plight, Austin then draws on the neuroscience to make helpful recommendations on how law students, lawyers, law schools, and law firms can optimize
the brain health and overall wellness of law students and attorneys. She explains in detail why exercise, particularly aerobic exercise, is key to the cognitive and emotional wellbeing of us all.85
IMPLICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY FOR FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE
Last but certainly not least, several of the contributions focus on how psychological insights can help lawyers better achieve fairness and justice. In Taboo Procedural Tradeoffs: Examining How the Public Experiences Tradeoffs
Between Procedural Justice and Cost, Victor D. Quintanilla considers the inevitable tradeoff between procedural fairness and cost.86 While, as Quintanilla
notes, Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires processes that are
just, speedy, and inexpensive,87 inevitably these goals are in tension. Here,
Quintanilla connects bodies of work on both procedural justice88 and taboo
tradeoffs,89 also reporting on his original empirical work regarding the public’s
willingness to trade fairness for time or money. In brief, Quintanilla finds,
through experimental vignettes, that people express a willingness to pay hun-
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dreds or thousands of dollars to obtain a fairer process.90 He also finds that
where people were given a fair process as a default they were unwilling to sell
it for an unfair process unless given, on average, half a million dollars.91 Quintanilla draws on his findings to critique the Supreme Court’s current approach
to procedural due process, which emphasizes decisional accuracy and the
weighing of costs and benefits.92
Nicole E. Negowetti uses social science research to examine the lack fairness and justice within the legal profession itself.93 Noting that the racial and
gender diversity within the legal profession is quite poor, and has worsened rather than improved in recent years,94 Negowetti suggests that this bleak situation can be attributed in substantial part to implicit or unconscious bias. After
summarizing research on implicit bias, Negowetti suggests that such bias affects both the hiring and evaluation of attorneys. Negowetti then explains why
the lack of diversity in the legal profession is problematic,95 and suggests steps
law firms can take with regard to hiring and evaluation practices to fight
against implicit biases and help diversify the profession.96
Finally, Jonathan M. Hyman shows how better understanding of moral
psychology can help attorneys and mediators do their jobs more effectively.97
Specifically, he explores whether the branch of moral psychology known as
Moral Foundations Theory (“MFT”)98 can provide substantial insights into
“how fairness works on the ground, day to day, in mediation and negotiation.”99 In the first parts of the article Hyman shows how applying MFT can
help explain results in various mediations and negotiations. While recognizing
critiques that have been made of MFT,100 Hyman nonetheless cautiously concludes that focusing on moral judgments “provides ways to engage the moral
dimensions of difference and conflict without stifling the opportunities for both
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creative problem solving and greater understanding that good negotiation and
mediation can provide.”101
CONCLUSION
As many have noted, the conference was just the beginning, albeit a very
nice beginning, of an attempt to coalesce the field of psychology and lawyering. This written version of the conference now expands upon many of the insights expressed at the conference and will, we hope, allow more academics
and practitioners from across disciplines and across the world to join and further the conversation.
By continuing to bridge divides between academics and practitioners, between disciplines and sub-disciplines, and across geographic lines, we will further the enterprise of applying psychology to lawyering tasks and lawyers’ and
law students’ personal wellbeing. The excitement in the air in Las Vegas in
February 2014 was palpable. Let’s dedicate ourselves to furthering this venture—in the interest of helping attorneys and their clients and also having fun
learning from one another!
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